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testify as to one of the most important elements of her proof. It did
this in order to sustain a rule which is without logic and poorly suited
to modern conditions. To adopt the policy announced by Lord Mans-
field is to protect an unfaithful wife, to protect her paramour, both
of whom have grossly violated the marital relation, to close the mouth
of the injured husband, and to force him to support a child which,
in fact, is not his.38 The dissent is more persuasive in its recognition
that for many years the trend has been to remove disqualifications of
witnesses, either by modifying the common law rules, or by liberally
construing statutes, in the interest of the unhampered ascertainment
of truth.
ROBERT R. LAFORTtTNE
DISCRIMINATORY ENFORCEMENT OF BLUE LAWS
AS DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION
Although the United States Supreme Court has held that Sunday
Closing Laws do not infringe upon religious freedom,' the discrimina-
tory enforcement of these laws may be unconstitutional as a denial
of equal protection of the laws under the fourteenth amendment.2
When blue laws do not reflect a strong public opinion, or when con-
fusion exists as to the classification of the various stores to which the
ordinances are to be applied,3 enforcement policies may be sporadic,
based on prejudice rather than a rational pattern.
The recent New York case of People v. Paine Drug Co.,4 a decision
by the Monroe County Court was the first to find a pattern of dis-
crimination in the enforcement of a blue law and recognize this cir-
cumstance as a defense to a criminal prosecution. At the hearing on
the indictment, voluminous testimony was given before a single
judge, who granted the motion to quash.
6Moore v. Smith, 178 Miss. 383, 172 So. 317, 320 (1937).
'McGowan v. Maryland, 866 U.S. 420 (ig6i); Two Guys from Harrison-Allen-
town, Inc. v. McGinley, 866 U.S. 582 (ig6i); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 US. 599 (1961);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Massachusetts, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
7Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961).
8According to defendant's brief, page 4, the District Attorney admitted the
truth of a newspaper article published prior to the defendant's arrest in which
he was quoting as stating: "I feel the law in its present form is unreasonable,
it is valid to sell fruit, but not vegetables, hot dogs but not hamburgs [sic], milk
but not butter. I do not propose to lend the services of my offices to any enforce-
ment of a law which makes such distinctions."
4241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct. 1963).
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The Rochester Executive Committee of the Retail Merchant's
Council instituted proceedings to prevent eleven large cut-rate type
stores from operating on Sunday. At the hearing on the indictment
the Executive Committee readily admitted that its motive was econom-
ic preservation and that the specific class chosen for prosecution con-
sisted of large-size discount or cut-rate stores that were competing
with the more prominent retail merchants.5 Both before and after
these prosecutions many other stores were violating the statute, but
they had not been prosecuted within the memory of incumbent of-
ficials. These violations were known to the public authorities, who
had no intention to follow up the immediate prosecutions with a
policy of general enforcement.6 Consequently, the court found that
the public authorities were acting as the agents of the merchant group.
The Monroe County Court in deciding People v. Paine relied heav-
ily on a New York Appellate Division decision, People v. Utica Daw's
Drug Co.,7 which enunciated the few established rules in the area of
discriminatory enforcement of a nondiscriminatory law. The lower
court in Utica was reversed on an evidence point, but the court by way
of dicta laid down rules as to the facts that would establish a constitu-
tional violation and the procedural route to be followed in setting
up such a defense. In Utica the Appellate Division recognized three
procedural routes as being available to the defendant.8 These remedies
are: (i) a hearing on the indictment, (2) an affirmative defense at the
trial, and, (3) an action in equity to enjoin the criminal prosecution.
In New York the defendant obtains a hearing on the indictment by
filing a motion for an order dismissing the indictment. Although New
York has no specific statutory provision for such a motion, there is
precedent for entertaining any motion to quash an indictment, which
is based on constitutional grounds, at a hearing on the indictment.9
Since the discrimination issue has no bearing on the guilt or inno-
cence of the accused, the evidence can best be heard at a separate pro-
ceeding. A hearing presided over by a single judge can examine the
facts and law of the discriminatory enforcement charge and decide
whether the alleged violation should be presented to a jury. A second
advantage is that a dismissal of the indictment does not render the
qd. at 950.
OSupra note 3.
716 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.2d 128 (1962).
8225 N.Y.S.2d at 134.
OPeople v. Glenn, 173 N.Y. 395, 66 N.E. 112 (1903) (insufficient evidence to sup-
port the indictment); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225
N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); (discriminatory enforcement of statute); People v. Gonzales,
31 Misc. 2d 486, 221 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Ct. Gen Sess. 1961) (illegally seized evidence).
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entire proceedings res judicata, since the authorities can institute a
new action under an impartial enforcement policy.
In regard to an affirmative defense raised at the trial, Mapp v.
Ohio' ° has recently re-emphasized that where a constitutional right
has been withheld the defendant must have the right to assert that
violation as a bar to conviction at the trial. "To hold otherwise is
to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoy-
ment."11 There are reasons which make it unfair to limit defendant to
this one method of asserting his constitutional right. First, it forces
the jury to decide a complex issue wholly disconnected from the
general issues. Second, if the defendant has been denied equal pro-
tection of the laws, then the expense and public embarrassment of a
trial are just a continuation of that discrimination. If the prejudicial
treatment actually exists, it should be discovered at the earliest pos-
sible time. A disadvantage from the standpoint of the prosecution is
that if the laws have been applied in an unequal manner the episode
is res judicata, and there will be no opportunity to reprosecute under
a fairer policy.
In regard to an equitable action to enjoin a criminal prosecution,
there are some factors which make this an uncertain remedy. Because
the businesses have been operating under illegal conditions, it is
doubtful whether the offending storeowners may claim that the ordin-
ance interfered with a lawful property right.' 2 The defendant is
usually unable to claim that he has no adequate remedy at law.13
Also an equity court can resort to the "clean hands" doctrine in order
to refuse the injunction.14 Due to the crowded dockets and delays in-
volved in exhausting rights of appeal, the officials against whom the
injunctions are directed are frequently no longer in office when the
case comes to a final determination, and the court avoids issuing the
10367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"id. at 656.
"Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S. 500, 507 (1905) (dictum); Crowley v. Christen-
sen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d l,8 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1943); People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1941).
"-But see Bargain City U.C.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 489 (1962).
Defendant was owner of store and police threatened his concessionaires and their
employees with prosecution for blue law violations. Defendant had no adequate
remedy at law and an injunction was his only means available to prevent irre-
parable injury.
"'Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 3o8
(1949)-
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injunction upon the assumption that the new officials will not act in
a discriminatory manner.' 5
Assuming that the Sabbath law is valid, the two elements which
must be established are: (i) conscious discriminatory enforcement of
the statute against a class or individual and (2) absence of an intention
to follow up the initial prosecution with a general enforcement.
As to the conscious discrimination, a heavy burden of proof must
be sustained by the defendant.' 0 Apparently courts feel that wrong-
doers will take advantage of the rule to avoid responsibility for their
acts, unless strong proof of bias is required.17 The compiling of sta-
tistics that show which groups have been prosecuted is the only objec-
tive way to prove a discriminatory motive.ls Prejudical enforcement
against a political, racial or religious group is more blatant than when
directed at a group of stores. This is the main reason discriminatory
enforcement involving blue law violations has been found in only the
principal case.' 9
The most obvious evidence that the authorities have no intention
to proceed with a general enforcement policy is the police depart-
ment's past record of arrests. In Paine, the District Attorney was so
exasperated by the confused state of the Sabbath laws that at one time
he announced that he would not enforce them.2 0
'5Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961);
Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
"6Taylor v. City of Pine Bluff, 266 Ark. 3o9, 289 SAV.2d 679 (1956); State v.
Karmil Merchandising Corp., 158 Me. 450, 186 A.2d 352 (1962); People v. Friedman,
302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div.
2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); City of South Euclid v. Bondy, 192 N.E.2d 139 (Euclid
Munic. Ct. Ohio 1963).
27People v. Darcy, 59 Cal. App. 2d 342, 139 P.2d 118 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943);
Sherman v. State, 324 Miss. 775, 1o8 So. 2d 205 (1959). This argument loses its force
when it is realized that one of the defendant's main contentions is that the law
is being openly flouted by the rest of the business community. In only two cases
involving malum in se crimes has discriminatory enforcement been raised as a
defense: People v. Zammora, 66 Cal. App. 2d 166, 152 P.2d i8o (Dist. Ct. App. 1944)
(attempted murder); People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. App. 2d 1, 117 P.2d 437 (Dist.
Ct. App. 1941) (pandering).
n'People v. Harris, 173 Cal. App. 2d 597, 343 P.2d 765 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(gambling arrest figures in City of Pasadena showed that 276 Negroes and 16 Whites
were apprehended in 1957, while in the year 1959 only Negroes were arrested);
Society of Good Neighbors v. Van Antwerp, 324 Mich. 22, 36 N.W.2d 308 (1949)
(.13 bingo games operating at time of arrest); note, Discriminatory Law Enforcement
and Equal Protection From the Law, 59 Yale L.J. 354 (1950).
"241 N.Y.S.2d 946.
-'Ihe New York Sabbath Law makes the following exceptions to its general
prohibitory law: food sales, services and delivery before io a.m.; sale of prepared
food by grocers, delicatessens, bakeries, 4-7:30 p.m.; off limits sale of beer before
3 a.n. and after 1 p.m. in certain cities; farmers' markets, farm produce, road-
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When the essential elements of discrimination have been estab-
lished, the state may still justify its apparently arbitrary action by
showing a reasonable basis for its selection of defendants. 21 Selective
enforcement of a blue law may be justified if: (i) insufficient funds
and inadequate manpower prevent general enforcement,2 2 (2) a prima-
ry objective is the deterrent effect on other violators, 23 (3) a test case is
necessary, 24 and, (4) a laxity of enforcement policy is evident without
a prejudicial intent.
2 5
The justification that inadequate resources precludes adequate in-
vestigations and enforcement will be established by showing that a
rational pattern of enforcement has been followed. The Rochester
Police Chief in the Paine case testified that he could have handled as
many as a thousand violations in a month or two if necessary,20 and
so there was no justification for the indictment of Paine on this basis.
The second justification occurs when the executive branch wishes
to initiate a new policy of enforcement; then, a few selected prosecu-
tions may be legally acceptable for their deterrent value on other vio-
lators. The reasonable basis being that the value of the deterrent effect
on the community outweighs the injustice of prosecuting a few indi-
viduals. At the Paine hearing there was no evidence that any other
store, being illegally operated, had closed as a result of the Paine prose-
cutions, and the District Attorney did not indicate that deterrent value
was a consideration.
The third justification occurs when a test case is being brought
to determine the constitutionality or the meaning of a blue law. At
the Paine hearing no evidence was offered to show that the Sabbath
Laws were unclear. Doubt concerning the application of the laws may
justify a test case, as if the prosecution wants to know (i) whether
stands, tackle and bait stores. N.Y. Pen. Law, § 2147 (Supp. 1962). See also note 3,
supra.
2aKotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947); Barbier
v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885); Taylor v. City of Pine Bluff, 226 Ark. 3o9, 289 S.W.2d
679 (1956).
22Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 33o U.S. 552 (1947); Bargain
City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1926).
People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962).
2'Broad-Grace Arcade Corp. v. Bright, 48 F.2d 348 (E.D. Va. 1931).
23Boynton v. Fox W. Coast Theatres Corp., 6o F.2d 851 (0oth Cir. 1932); Taylor
v. City of Pine Bluff, 266 Ark. 3o9, 289 S.W.2d 679 (1956); Wade v. City of San
Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P.2d 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); People v. Fried-
man, 3o2 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (195o); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App.
Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1962); City of South Euclid v. Bondy, 192 N.E.2d 139
(Euclid Munic. Ct. Ohio 1963).
2Brief for Defendant, p. 21.
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the courts intend to uphold the blue laws,27 or (2) whether a drug
store which also sells hardware, toiletries and cosmetics can remain
open on Sunday, under the exception provided for in the New York
Penal Laws.28 For drug stores, these facts would justify bringing a test
case and the selection of particular defendants for such a test case.
The Paine court did not discuss this possibility and apparently it was
not raised.
20
The fourth justification is laxness of enforcement. Although the
selection of a few random violators for prosecution has no rational
basis, it is not condemned by the courts as a violation of the equal
protection clause because it involves no purposeful discrimination.
An example of laxity of enforcement not being sufficient to void the
indictment is found in the Ohio case of People v. Bondy.30 In that
case the police had a policy of nonenforcement of blue laws, but they
would prosecute if a private citizen presented them with evidence
of a violation.
Within the past three years the discriminatory enforcement issue
has been the subject of litigation in the United States Supreme Court
and in three other jurisdictions. 31 It is submitted that the following
statements are valid conclusions concerning the use of discriminatory
enforcement as a constitutional defense: (i) Conscious, discriminatory
enforcement of a law by an arm of the state is a greater wrong than
the violation of a blue law. (2) A hearing on the indictment is the most
equitable manner to present to the court a charge of prejudicial en-
forcement. (3) The heavy burden of proof will prevent the violator of
a blue law from using the rule as a loophole for evading a deserved
punishment. (4) The easily satisfied standard of reasonableness by
which the public authorities can justify their decision to select those
whom they wish to prosecute does not place an unreasonable burden
on law enforcement officials.
The decision in People v. Paine will encourage public authorities
to either follow a rational pattern of enforcement or completely defy
the legislatures by refusing all prosecutions. If the latter alternative
"Supra, note 3.
' N.Y. Pen. Law, § 2147 (Supp. 1962).
nSupra, note 28.
92 N.E.2d 139 (Eculid Munic Ct. Ohio 1963).
aTwo Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 420 (101);
People v. Paine Drug Co., 241 N.Y.S.2d 946 (Monroe County Ct. 1963); City of
South Euclid v. Bondy, 192 N.E.2d 139 (Euclid Munic. Ct. Ohio 1963); Bargain
City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
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